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ALLEGORIES OF THE INVISIBLE. OR, HOW TO 
ESTRANGE ECONOMY (THEOLOGICALLY)? 
MATEUSZ PIOTROWSKI 
 
 
Abstract: The paper tries to once again bring into play the classical ideas of the Marxian 
critique of political economy and to demonstrate how these ideas can be reactivated by an 
injection of theology. Special attention will be dedicated to the theologically intensified notion 
of alienation, treated not only as a subject but also as a method of criticism. The aim of such 
an estranging method is to make visible the “transcendental plane” of the capitalist historical 
a priori. This will be done through the production of allegories, that is figurations of the 
infinite movement of the capitalist totality. Starting with a critique of the disenchanted 
Euhumerism of Hardt and Negri, who want to demythologise political economy as nothing 
but relations between people, I attempt to show the limits of their approach, by exposing the 
constitution of capital as the creation of an inverted reality. In this process, hypostasis of 
human labour (i.e. capital) gets the upper hand over human beings, not only in imagination, 
but also in reality, making a clear-cut distinction between real and imagined entities 
questionable. Through the analysis of the focal points of this process, I will attempt to 
demonstrate a complex interplay of subsequent disenchantments and miraculations, which 
establish capital as something more than human, while simultaneously naturalising its 
phantasmic becoming as the very core of the reality principle. Alienation as method tries to 
break the simultaneity of miraculation/disenchantment by dividing apparently unitary 
semblance – fetish – into distinct and potentially conflicted layers. Potential for this conflict is 
produced by two estrangement effects. Firstly, by juxtaposing a finite human subject with the 
infinite process of capital. Secondly, by thinking of conversion, which – becoming the highest 
point of alienation – could enable the human being to establish itself as an autonomous 
subject against the gods of this world and its own worldly self. 
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I EXPOSITION 
Political economy and the invisible 
“We need to stop confusing politics with theology”,write Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, 
beginning the last part of their trilogy with “a repudiation of an apocalyptic tone adopted 
recently in philosophy” (Hardt and Negri 2009, 5). According to the authors of Commonwealth, 
many critiques of capitalism resemble “those medieval European renditions of hell: people 
burning in a river of fire, others being torn limb from limb, and in the centre a great devil 
engorging their bodies whole” (Hardt and Negri 2009, 3). But, Negri and Hardt argue, there 
is no great Satan. We are dealing with the powers of capital and law, both entirely of this 
world. What is needed is not political theology (or demonology), but rather something they 
call Euhemerism. Just like the ancient critic Euhemerus had explained that myths about gods 
are nothing but exaggerated narratives about divinised kings, a new political Euhemerism 
should demonstrate that what seems to be transcendent, otherworldly Power is in reality 
nothing but relations between people. 
 The present research shares Hardt and Negri’s conviction that in order to 
understand the powers that be of our time, we have to engage in a critical enquiry into the 
entanglement of socio-economico-political relations, which the Marxian tradition used to call 
political economy. The notion of critique here should be understood in its strict sense, i.e. as 
an exposition of the a priori conditions of experience and appearance. These historical a priori 
conditions (or rather incessant conditioning) constitute a transcendental plane, which 
“occupies a position not wholly in the immediate, immanent facts of experience but not 
wholly outside them either” (Hardt and Negri 2009, 6).  
 According to the Italian-American philosophical duo, the capitalist transcendental 
plane, which shapes the conditions of the possibility of social life, is established in and 
through our everyday practices. And these practices are mundane, micrological, capillary etc. 
However, Hardt and Negri add another adjective, which should make us think twice before 
we fully embrace their proposal to get rid of all theology in analysing capitalism. They say that 
the socio-economic powers conditioning our experience are invisible. On the one hand power 
structures are so deeply embedded in our everyday lives, in the movements of our bodies, in 
our consciousness and unconsciousness, in our subjective and infra-subjective behaviour – 
every time we go to work, every time we go shopping – that they have become unperceivable. 
On the other hand, the movement of an abstract self-valorising value incessantly circulating 
at enormous speed in the heavens of financialised speculative capitalism seems to be 
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ungraspable by a finite human mind. As if capital was at  the same time too small and too big 
to be perceived.  
 
Alienation as method 
What is needed here is a conceptual and figurative device which could make the 
transcendental plane of capital – in the immediacy and abstractness of which we are all 
immersed – visible. In order to construct such a device I would like to turn to the somehow 
dusty and outmoded notion of alienation. It will not only be the object of our study but also its 
method. Alienation as method is aimed at producing estrangement effects, suddenly exposing the 
normal world, where everything is as it is, as something much more enchanted than we tend 
to think. That is why theology – that is a science which deals with the invisible – might be of 
some use for the analysis of capital.  
 Estrangement effects created by a juxtaposition of theological imagery with political 
economy could enable us to step out of an undifferentiated movement, to grasp an invisible 
monster, which has no measurements and escapes definitions – to finally grasp it as               
a historical a priori which is always almost present as the unrepresentable condition of all 
appearances.  Or, to use the language of Paul of Tarsus: it could help to expose the ruler of 
the kingdom of the air, the invisible atmosphere, the very air we are breathing as an alien 
power which stands against us (see: Ephesians 2:2, Colossians 2:14).  
 What is the position of a human subject (say, a reader or the author of this text) in 
this process of estrangement? What is his position towards the protagonists of our moral 
play: capital, the capitalist and the worker?  
 
For what else is he if not the brother of the characters, caught in the spontaneous myths 
of ideology, in its illusions and privileged forms, as much as they are? If he is kept at         
a distance from the play itself, it is not to spare him or set him apart as a Judge – on the 
contrary, it is to take him and enlist him in this apparent distance, in this “estrangement” 
– to make him into this distance itself, the distance which is simply an active and living 
critique (Althusser, 1962). 
 
Critique brings the process to a stand-still. When the infinite movement suddenly stops, 
exposed as something alien, a certain distance is produced. Powers – confronting me from 
the outside as the alienated fruit of my own work, and from the inside as “another law at 
work in me, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner” (Romans 
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7:23)1 – these powers could be therefore grasped as something non-identical with me. Even 
though they do co-constitute the very fabric of myself and the actual conditions of the 
process of subjectification, I can alienate myself from them. The human subject abstracts 
itself from the totalising socius and from its own self in the gesture of self-alienation, coming 
to a Paulinian conclusion that: “if I do not will, this I do, it is no longer I that work it out, but 
sin that dwells in me” (Romans 7: 17). Alienation as a method could make us step out from 
the Heraclitean river of capital’s becoming, and achieve at least partial, conceptual mastery 
over its totality. 
 
Blockage of figuration 
Putting an infinite process into definitions, especially if chaos and fragmentation seem to be 
its very principles, seems ridiculous. The finite human subject and its subjective opinion 
appears to be comically incommensurable with capital’s measureless becoming. Much of 
contemporary thought relies on this incommensurability, ridiculing any attempt to master this 
chaosmos. Dominant doxa claims that the will to construct a mental totalisation must lead to 
totalitarian theory and, ultimately, to totalitarian practice. Or at best it has to remain nothing 
more than pathetic hubris: the pride of limited human reason confronted with powers 
infinitely exceeding it.  
 Let there be no misunderstanding. Those who advocate the superiority of these 
processes are definitely right; nonnegotiable facts stand behind them. Nevertheless, we will 
risk the stupidity of reasoning, which tries to grasp the air surrounding us and is always left 
empty-handed.  
 Here we are confronted with the problem of invisibility once again. It can be traced 
back to the text which shaped popular beliefs on classical economy: Adam Smith’s famous 
fragment on “the invisible hand” (Smith 1976, 456). While analysing this expression it is 
important to give equal value to both elements of this figurative concept. That is, to take into 
consideration both the idea of the rational providence evoked by the action of the “hand” – 
and its “invisibility”. The order, the rational pattern is there, however it remains ungraspable 
by the human eye and incomprehensible for the human reason of an actor embedded in 
economic reality; be it a worker, a merchant or a political sovereign. As Michel Foucault 
(Foucault 2008, 278–286) rightly noted in his reading of this text, non-transparency, or the 
objective blindness of agents engaged in economic action is constitutive for the rationality of 
the process. Human subjects act rationally if they are trying to predict ultimately 
                                               
1   All quotations from the Bible are taken from the New International Version. 
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unpredictable movements of the mighty hand. In contrast, any attempts to contradict the 
unfathomable verdicts of the economic reason, any attempts to intervene in the operations of 
the market, disturb the rational course of events – must lead to catastrophe. The human 
subject, be it individual or social, cannot posit itself on the level of the sovereign who sees the 
process and thus is able to shape its a priori conditions. Or at least that is what the economic 
Biblia pauperum teaches us.   
 However, it would be overhasty to state, as Foucault does, that imposition of the 
economic reason makes the very idea of totality impossible, establishing economy as a fully 
immanent, atheistic domain, where there is no place for invisible Providence2. Totality is 
there, constituting the interrelation of independent agents, and guaranteeing harmonious 
coincidence. Thanks to this strange coincidence the pursuit of the maximisation of an 
individual profit is claimed to lead necessarily to general benefit and a just, rational allocation 
of resources (see Foucault 2005; Marx 1990, 280; Vogl 2015). The totality exists precisely as 
invisible. It remains at the threshold of the subject’s consciousness. As when we wake up 
every morning disquieted, trying to remind ourselves in vain of what it was that we  did not 
do yesterday. 
 
Allegories of totality 
We have said that the concept-image of the invisible hand keeps the totality  an almost-
present, tacit precondition and the unsurpassable horizon of reasoning. It cannot step-over 
the point of figuration and conceptualisation, after which it could become an object of 
critique. A strange mixture of visible and invisible, sensuous and super-sensuous confronts us 
not only on the macro-level of totality, but also on the micro-level where we meet the cellular 
form of  capitalist society – commodity. Commodity appears as something unitary: an 
unbreakable atom of socio-economic physics. Capitalist fetishism creates something that 
Marx calls “an indissoluble fusion” (Marx 1990, 983) of the sensuous and the super-sensuous. 
And this fusion proves to be strangely resistant to analysis. 
 The social whole does not give itself to our cognition in any transparent symbol. 
There is no object of experience which could work as its pars totalis, a monad, in which 
totality is simply present. A statement that tries to pin down totality cannot be anything more 
than an example: a shadow, which precedes the body, a figure, which comes before the real 
                                               
2  To make Foucault’s strong claim more questionable one could recall the strange similarity of  the 
supposedly atheist Smithian invisible hand described in Foucault’s Birth of  Biopolitics to the beatific vision of   
the divine, cosmic necessity to which the Stoic sage has to adjust himself, which we encounter in his 
Hermeneutics of  the Subject (Foucault 2008, 283–285). This of  course tells us something not only about Adam 
Smith or Seneca, but also about Foucault’s own position, after the fall of  the revolutionary wave of  the sixties.  
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thing (Hebrews 1:10, see also de Lubac 1988). As Marx warns us, whoever simply identifies 
capital with a material, visible thing, falls into fetishism. Fetish is no-thing (1 Corinthians 
10:19–20), even if it uses a material body as its bearer. That is why, instead of seeing totality 
in any particular, concrete symbol we need to satisfy ourselves with what Paul of Tarsus 
baptised as allegories (Galatians 4:24–26). Allegories, in contrast to symbols, are necessarily 
partial and incomplete (Benjamin 2003, Jameson 2008). The allegorical gaze always requires 
an interpretative or political act: a decision on the part of the subject, be it individual or 
collective. The subject has to recognise a figure in a cloud, to draw the lines between 
dispersed dots in order to see the movement of totality in a concrete moment for the first 
time. 
 
The object of analysis: the production process 
This might all sound too poetic. However, as Bertolt Brecht teaches us, in certain 
circumstances an intensified poetical estrangement effect can work as an instrument of 
scientific cognisance. What I want to prove in my paper is that this figurative operation we 
call estrangement can be treated as an actual method of Marxian analysis, in its literal sense. 
Analysis dissects and discerns. What is, what gets dissected in Capital? I would like to argue 
that it is firstly and most importantly fetish, that is, as we have said, a very peculiar indissoluble 
amalgamate of the sensuous and the super-sensuous. 
 The vast majority of  commentators recalls the concept of fetish solely in the context 
of the opening chapters of Das Kapital, where Marx deals with so called “simple circulation”. 
Thus fetishism is usually analysed as a problem emerging in the sphere of exchange and 
eventually, consumption (with important consequences for the reconstruction of Marxian 
thought). In my reading I  try to take into consideration fetishist “equivocation”,                    
a phantasmic becoming, which takes place not only in exchange, but also at the heart of the 
production process.  
 Thanks to such an analysis, rather than being confronted with a unitary block of 
totality on the one hand and the unbreakable atom of commodity on the other, we could see 
them as incoherent and temporary production processes. What is more, under an estranging 
gaze the production process itself falls apart, exposing the coincidence of two very different 
realities: the labour process and the valorisation process. In the actual reality (or rather: in the reality 
as conditioned by  capitalist a priori conditioning) these two processes merge, appearing as       
a unitary semblance: fetish. The analysis of fetishes tries to dissolve it, by breaking it into 
distinct and potentially – but only potentially – conflicted layers. The task of a critique of 
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fetishes is to alienate the poles, which constitute this semblance, to polarise them and to turn 
one against the other. 
 Inside the fetishist visual field social objects and subjects are presented as something 
unitary: as “commodity”, “labour” or “capital” pure and simple. Things and actions (the 
commodity on a supermarket shelf, the act of buying this commodity for money, the act of 
earning this money for producing other commodities) appear “at first sight an extremely 
obvious, trivial thing”. Only “analysis” exposes it as something “abounding in metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties” (Marx 1990, 163). The analysis of fetishes tries to arrest 
the indivisible movement of the capitalisation of labour, in order to dissect it and expose its 
strangely twofold character. To understand how this process works, it is necessary to make it 
stand still, as if by using a slow-motion camera, separating moments and movements, which 
in capitalist reality exist in the eternal present of creatio continua of incessant production-
distribution-exchange-consumption-production. The method applied here tries to produce 
such a chemical solution which will make elements of fetishist “indissoluble amalgamation” 
precipitate. 
 
II ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTION 
Inversion, or why is disenchanted critique not enough? 
These are, however, still promises without sufficient grounding. Let us come back to Hardt 
and Negri to see better – in contrast to their optimistic, secular, enlightened Euhumersim – 
how theological estrangement works. Hardt and Negri’s attack on political theology recalls 
the rhetorical pathos of young Marx’s critique of religion (stop looking for sovereignty in the 
heavens and recognise the structures of power on earth!). The aim of such a critique is to 
present things as they really are. Young Marx’s “irreligious criticism” is based on an 
assumption that “Man makes religion, religion does not make man” (Marx 1992, 244). Religious 
inversion, which pictures the producer (man) as conditioned by his product (god) is 
something in the imagination only, but in truth and reality nothing.  
 For young Marx and his mentor, Ludwig Feuerbach, the main subject of criticism, 
the arch-enemy, who managed to prolong the existence of religion by dressing it up as 
philosophy was, of course, G.W.F. Hegel. According to the young radicals, Hegel,                 
a theologian undercover, a bookish idealist, an apologist of the Prussian authoritarian state, in 
an all too Christian manner replaced the concrete, sensual, living human subjectivity, a man 
of flesh and blood, a man with a body (and a stomach!) with a theoretical, abstract hypostasis 
called the Idea. In his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right Marx condemns the Hegelian Idea 
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– the supposedly self-positioning Subject – as nothing but an inversion of real relations. He 
finds Hegel guilty of a “logical, pantheistic mysticism” (Marx 1992, 61), which conceives 
human beings to be mere moments of the process of the actualisation of the Idea. Describing 
how social positions really are distributed in the modern state and how the division of labour 
operates in  modern society, young Marx writes:  
 
The real relationship is “that the assignment of the material of the state to any given 
individual is mediated by circumstances, his caprice and his personal choice of his station 
in life”. This fact, this real relationship is described by speculative philosophy as 
appearance, as phenomenon. […] The family and civil society are the preconditions of 
the state; they are the true agents; but in speculative philosophy it is the reverse. When 
the Idea is subjectivized the real subjects – civil society, the family, “circumstances, 
caprice etc.” – are all transformed into unreal, objective moments of the Idea [...] the 
condition is posited as the conditioned, the determinator as the determined, the producer 
as the product (Marx 1992, 60–63). 
 
We find here a sharp contrast between “the real” and its inversion in speculation. Inside this 
critical framework capital cannot be conceptualised otherwise, than as a merely imaginative 
hypostasis of the actions of individuals and their families; as nothing but a semblance. 
 But, for some reason, workers find this illusion real enough to make them work. 
How does capital succeed in changing individuals into nothing but living elements of                
a collective machine producing profit? Is capital a real thing or a phantasmagoria? If we could 
really speak of a rupture between the rhetoric of the young and the mature Marx, it does not 
happen with the abandonment of the “religious myth” of alienation. “Rupture” (or rather the 
reconfiguration of the elements of thought, a regrouping forced by the blockage 
encountered) is produced by the attempt to conceptualise the strangely sensuous-super-
sensuous, real-phantasmagorical character of capital. The problem of alienation was 
persistently and stubbornly present in the writings of Marx (see Marx 1990, 989–990, 1002–
1003)3. As we will see, for the mature Marx alienation is above all a matter of the results of 
production under a specific social formation. Criticism of religion, defined as the fundament of 
all criticism in his early writings, remains. But in the Grundrisse and Das Kapital it does not 
operate in the mode of a Euhemerist denunciation of the misty creations of religion as merely 
inexistent hypostases. “Irreligion” returns as a practical critique of fetishes. Capital as fetish, 
far from being something in the imagination only, is immersed in material practices and 
produces real effects. It organises the division of the social field and the division of social 
labour: 
                                               
3  In these writings Marx explicitly discusses religious alienation in the context of  the capitalist relations of  
production, using both the terms “alienation” (Entfremdung) and “fetish”. 
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Capital is the lifeblood that flows through/in the body politic of all those societies we call 
capitalists […]. It is thanks to this flow that we, who live under capitalism, acquire our 
daily bread, as well as our houses, cars, cell phones, shirts, shoes and all the other goods 
we need to support our daily life. By way of these flows the wealth is created from which 
the many services that support, entertain, educate, resuscitate or cleanse us are provided. 
By taxing this flow states augment their power, their military might and their capacity to 
ensure an adequate standard of life for their citizens. Interrupt, slow down or, even 
worse, suspend the flow and we encounter a crisis of capitalism in which daily life can no 
longer go on in the style to which we have become accustomed (Harvey 2010, vi). 
 
Participation in and dependence on capital flows can be more or less direct. Our income 
which gives us access to the means of subsistence and makes our existence possible does not 
have to be acquired in the form of the wage. It can be the gain of a speculator, the pension of 
a pensioner, the benefit of a benefiter or the share of income transferred from a wage-
labourer to his wife for her reproductive labour. In any case, it seems that the means of 
subsistence ultimately comes from a single source – capital. It appears – and here I ask the 
reader to keep in mind the uncertainty of this word – that in this world capital is                 
the breathable air, the invisible being in which human beings live and move and have their 
being. 
 What will the markets say about this? Are the markets happy with the new 
government? The hypostases of our own activity, the products of our own labour appear as   
a natural-divine precondition of labour, as a quasi-cause of the social process and as a self-
begotten being. In the Realprozess of capital, like in the movement of the Hegelian Idea, 
capital posits and presents itself as a presupposition of labour, changing its precondition into 
something conditioned. Real, concrete, finite human beings are subsumed under capital to 
serve the infinite process of valorisation of abstract value, which has become the final goal of 
production. Human life is contingent, and becomes more and more precarious, whereas 
abstract markets attain ontological solidity. Capital posits the laws of its own reproduction as 
necessary, whereas the epiphenomenal existence of this or that particular human individual 
becomes perfectly unnecessary in the very moment that it ceases to play the role of a bearer 
of the valorisation process. The phantasy, which conceives the human subject to be             
“a moment of the inner imaginary activity” (Marx 1992, 62) of the Capital-Idea – this 
phantasy is made real in the actual production process whenever capital succeeds in turning 
living labour into a moment of its own becoming. The means of production, the products of 
labour, represented and personified by the capitalist, rule over  living labour as an alien power. 
This produces an inverted world, which cannot be fathomed by flat, two-dimensional, 
disenchanted Euhemerist discourses. 
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Sphere of tension: semblance/appearance  
Before we can penetrate this strange world (where dancing tables animated by the movement 
of exchange go about their own business and dead labour spiritualised as capital employs and 
commands living labour), we have to devote some time to the exegesis of the opening 
sentence of Capital. Or, to be more precise, to the exegesis of a single notion used in this 
sentence. A notion, which plays a crucial role in understanding the Marxian idea of sensuous–
super-sensuous social objectivity.  
 Marx begins his opus magnum with the following statement: “The wealth of societies 
in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears [erscheint] as an »immense 
collection of commodities«; the individual commodity appears as its elementary form” (Marx 
1990, 125). Marx picks his words very carefully here, and for good reason. He does not say 
that wealth simply is an immense collection of commodities. He says that under capitalism 
things appear as commodities. The meaning of the word Erscheinung used in this sentence is 
usually explained as “a necessary mode of expression” or “objective appearance”. It is often 
compared and contrasted with another closely connected, and at times overlapping term – 
Schein, which in this context is translated as “semblance” or “illusion” (see Bellofiore 2009). 
In the writings of the mature Marx there is an incessant ambivalence, a constant oscillation 
between Schein and Erscheinung, between appearance and semblance: between capital understood 
as an objective and necessary form of social mediation, and capital understood as something 
illusory, lacking any power, apart from the power extracted and expropriated from  living 
labour. The same ambiguity lies at the heart of the Marxian idea of human subjectivity. The 
meaning of “the subject” in Das Kapital is notoriously undetermined and unstable. It is 
simultaneously a surface effect of the underlying forces of capital and a genuine power of the 
self-determination latently present in the “residual subjectivity” (Arthur 2004, 53) of  workers 
resisting and fighting capital.   
 I will try to prove that this ambiguity in not a matter of Marx’s inability to 
distinguish clearly between the different meanings of words, but rather an expression of real 
ambivalences inherent to a specific social process. “Appearance” recurs in innumerable 
passages of Capital in the most decisive moments. It is used not only when Marx defines the 
“elementary form” of  capitalist society (i.e. commodity) but also when he speaks of capitalist 
production, which transforms dead labour into capital. Under capitalism things appear as 
commodities, living labour predominantly acquires the form of wage-labour and the means of 
production present themselves as being capital by nature. Thus, a specific social relation 
appears as something intrinsic to the thing-hood [dingliche Qualität] of a thing, 
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Under certain circumstances a chair with four legs and a velvet covering may be used as    
a throne. But the same chair, a thing for sitting on, does not become a throne by virtue of 
its use-value. The most essential factor in the labour process is the worker himself, and in 
antiquity the worker was a slave. But this does not imply that the worker is a slave by 
nature […] any more than spindles and cotton are capital by nature just because they are 
consumed nowadays by the wage-labourer in the labour process. The folly of identifying 
a specific social relation of production with the thing-like [dingliche] qualities of certain articles 
simply because it represents itself in terms of certain articles is what strikes us most 
forcibly when we open any textbook on economics and see on the first page how the 
elements of the process of production, reduced to their basic form, turn out to be land, 
capital and labour. One might just as well say that they were landed property, knives, scissors, 
spindles, cotton, grain, in short, the materials and means of labour, and wage-labour (Marx 
1990, 998, original emphasis). 
  
This “equivocation”, which produces an apparently indissoluble fusion of historically specific 
social forms and things (scissors-capital-spindles-wage-labour-grain-landed-property) is 
precisely what Marx calls fetishism. If it was only a matter of some logical error made by 
economists due to their lack of information or diligence it could easily be corrected simply  
by providing more information or by introducing a more adequate scientific paradigm. The 
problem is that “this illusion is one that springs out from the very nature of capitalist 
production itself” (Marx 1990, 998). If it is a folly, it is a generalised social folly. Fetishist 
appearance does not posit itself merely in the consciousness or imagination of actors on the 
market, but becomes the medium of appearance of all subjects and objects – constantly turning 
one into the other. It becomes a socially valid form of mediation: an objective thought form. 
This form of mediation is not established by a kind of social contract (as when all the 
participants consciously agree to treat a certain thing as a symbol of wealth). Rather it is 
posited through constant repetition. That is: in the actual acts of exchange and production. 
Value and capital are social practices. If capitalism is a religion it is above all else a cultic 
religion, a religion of everyday life, which makes the human subject kneel down, in following 
everybody around, while “faith” follows. And even if one does not believe fully in capitalist 
dogmas or is not fully conscious of them, one has to participate in the rituals of capitalist 
exchange and production in order to get access to goods and services. One has to take part, 
directly or indirectly, in the generation and realisation of value to get the means of 
subsistence. 
 This socially objective basis of fetishism is produced and reproduced not only in 
market exchange, when the abstract quality of exchangeability is attributed to materially 
different commodities, but also in the actual process of capitalist production. The capitalist 
buys commodities on the market, in order to employ them in production. He buys the means 
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of production, raw materials, machines and “labour”4. His money is now transformed into 
these commodities, they all belong to him and now they represent (vorstell) his capital. The 
means of production appears as capital, since it is in fact put to work producing profit for the 
capitalist. Abstract capital represents itself in concrete use-values. It incorporates living 
labour, acquiring a body that can work for it. For an appointed time  this body belongs to the 
capitalist just as all the other elements, just as the process itself, and just as the results of this 
process.  
 As Marx tirelessly repeats: in capitalism it is capital that employs and commands labour– not 
the other way around. The capitalist and his supervisors subjects who are in charge of the 
production process have the ability to command labour, by the sole (social) virtue of owning 
and representing capital. “Even this relation in its simplicity is a personification of things and 
a reification of persons. […] the objective conditions of labour, do not appear as subsumed 
under the worker; rather, he appears as subsumed under them” (Marx 1990, 1054). In 
capitalism it appears – with the whole power of socially objective appearance – that it is 
capital that gives jobs to the worker. It seems that objects (the means of production) by their very 
nature have the ability to employ and control living labour. Capital is effectively posited as      
a necessary form of the appearance of things, processes and human agents. 
 
Breaking the process 1: labour and valorisation 
Fetishist equivocation identifies a specific social form (an arrangement constituted of the 
relation between wage-labour and capital) with its thinghood (the fact that  it exists as            
a means of production, as stuff for making other stuff). Marx tries to separate this 
arrangement by distinguishing the labour process from the valorisation process. The labour process 
transforms its material into something socially useful: concrete labour produces concrete use-
values which form social wealth. The valorisation process creates abstract value, expressed in 
money. People under different social regimes of production have always worked to produce 
products, which will be socially5 useful for them, whereas in capitalism workers work under 
the control of the capitalist to produce commodities, in order to valorise value and to 
generate profit for the capitalist. The labour process is the trans-historical condition of the 
                                               
4  The unitary notion of  “labour” is also a fetishist appearance. Yet an analysis of  the crucial doubling 
inside this notion – a doubling that makes possible the movement of  differentiation and identification, which 
constitutes surplus-value, and thus capital –is outside of  the scope of  this paper.  
5   We should not forget that for Marx use-value is neither simply “natural”, nor does the labour process 
take place in the realm of  pure nature, since its product is always pre-determined by human needs/desires, 
which are themselves historical creations/social products, see Marx 1990, 287. 
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metabolism of human beings and nature.The valorisation process is a social form, which has 
become dominant under capitalism.  
 The labour process as such is “independent of every form […], or rather common to 
all forms of society in which human beings live” (Marx 1990, 290). The notion of the labour 
process is thus a trans-historical, theoretical generalisation6. It cannot appear directly in a pure 
state, because it is always already immersed in a definite set of the social relations of 
production, being only a moment of a historically specific whole. Thus it necessarily presents 
itself in specific, historically determined social forms of appearance, which are the modes of 
its existence. The capitalist valorisation (in production)7 is also materialised in a particular 
labour process. Although for value it is a matter of indifference if the surplus is generated by 
the production of flowers or guns, the abstract value in the production process has to be 
valorised in and through a concrete form of labour – thorough dressmaking, computer 
programming, spinning etc. 
 
Since labour creates value solely in a particular useful form, and since every specific useful 
kind of labour requires material and means of labour which possess a specific use value, 
[…] the labour can only be absorbed in so far as capital takes on the shape of the specific 
means of production required for particular labour processes, and only in this shape can 
capital absorb living labour. Here, therefore, one sees why the material elements of the 
labour process are seen as capital on account of their material characteristics by            
the capitalist, the worker and the political economist, the last-mentioned being capable of 
thinking of the labour process only as a labour process appropriated by capital. One also 
sees why the political economist is incapable of separating their material existence, as 
simply factors of the labour process, from the social quality attaching to them, which 
makes them into capital. He cannot do this because in reality the same identical labour 
process which the means of production serve through their material characteristics as 
mere means of subsistence of labour, converts those means of production into mere means 
for the absorption of labour. The worker makes use of the means of production in the 
labour process, considered in isolation. But in the labour process which is at the same time 
a capitalist production process the means of production make use of the worker, with the 
result that labour appears only as a means whereby a certain amount of value, hence        
a certain amount of objectified labour, absorbs living labour in order to preserve and 
                                               
6   Such a general notion is of  course related to but not identical with real abstraction, which has become 
effective under specific historical conditions. Real abstraction of  “abstract labour” is not simply a trans-
historical generalisation, but a real (cognitive and material) process of  abstracting from the concrete, useful 
character of  particular type of  labour in capitalist exchange and production.  
7   We have to restrain ourselves form analysing processes in which abstract capital appears as not mediated 
by any direct relation to material objects. Analysis of  the “autoerotic” relation of  Money to More Money      
(M–M’) in finance and the way in which finance falls back upon production is a matter of  the highest 
importance, requiring further investigation. 
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increase itself. Thus the labour process appears as a process of the self-valorisation of 
objectified labour by means of living labour (Marx 2015)8. 
 
Marx, takes pains to analytically distinguish (“isolate”) the labour process from the 
valorisation process, by showing that the valorising process is a historical and thus not 
absolutely necessary form acquired by the labour process. In production, the valorisation 
process has to be embodied by a concrete labour process. But the reverse does not hold.  
  
For the spinning process as such, for example, it is a matter of indifference that the 
cotton and the spindles represent the money of the capitalist, hence – capital, that the 
money expended is determined as capital. Cotton and spindles become the material and 
means of labour in the hands of the working spinner alone, and they become these things 
because he spins, not because he turns cotton belonging to another person into yarn for 
the same person by spinning with a spindle belonging to the same person (Marx 2015). 
 
The labour process does not have to acquire the capitalist form in order to produce use-
values: it is possible to recall or imagine that labour is done under other social regimes than 
capitalist valorisation. The capitalist form is neither eternal nor absolute. This enables us to 
abstract the trans-historical fundamentum of the labour process from capitalist reality. 
 What is more, the distinction between the labour process and the valorisation 
process exposes the inversion that I have tried to describe in previous sections. We can think 
of historical examples of societies in which social reproduction was not subordinated to the 
infinite production of abstract value. We can even recall such societies in which                  
the imperative of the ever-increasing production of material wealth was not self-evident. In 
such societies “[…] the typical reaction to economic good times, even among urban 
craftspeople and most of the protobourgeoisie, was to take more days off” (Graeber 2012, 
302). Many workers, having the opportunity to work more, preferred instead to celebrate 
what they called Saint Monday (see also Thompson 1993). By comparing our society to the 
communities in which it was by no means obvious to choose more money over more free 
time we could produce an estranging distance towards our presence. 
 
                                               
8   Here I use Ben Fowkes’ translation of  Marx’s Results of  the Direct Production Process available here: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/, since it is more precise than the one that 
can be found in Marx 1990, p 1054.  
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Fetishist production 
In the actual process of  capitalist production, however, the incessant “conversion” of the 
means of production utilised and controlled by living labour into means for controlling and 
exploiting living labour, make the two processes merge, creating an indissoluble amalgamate. 
Concrete labour (here: spinning)  uses specific raw materials (cotton) and means of 
production (spindles) to produce concrete products (yarn); a use-value which contributes to 
social wealth. If we take the standpoint of the pure labour process – abstracted from capitalist 
actuality – it might seem that it is the worker who is in charge, making use of the instruments 
of labour in order to transform  raw materials into a desired product.  Nevertheless, both the 
cotton and the machines exist as commodities owned by capitalists. The potential labour of 
the cotton spinner was also available on the market as a commodity bought by the capitalist, 
in order to valorise value. Finally, the spinner herself was actually put to work to produce 
surplus. The labour was not done twice: once to produce concrete use-value and later to 
generate abstract value. Inside the capitalist framework, the same movement of the body and 
mind produces products and valorises value. In the movement of labour there is yet another 
overlapping movement, which creates capital. The labour process and the valorisation 
process are phenomenologically coextensive. They are made identical, since the worker is 
made to work for the capitalist. 
 Identification of the means of production with capital produces two apparently 
opposed effects. On the one hand, the ability of capital to yield profit is attributed to the 
technical function of capital as means of production. It seems that profit is only a revenue for 
the technical function of the means of production in the labour process itself. Social 
phenomena (the generation of profit constituting capital) seem to derive directly and 
necessarily from technical phenomena. The capitalist can be thus presented as somebody who 
simply gets a fair share for his effort of managing creatively these means of production, 
rather than as a shareholder, who gets his due even if he has no idea what it is that is being 
produced in a factory a thousand miles away9. On the other hand, fetishism produces the 
reversed but symmetrical effect of deriving technical phenomena directly from their social 
form. For instance, the power to increase the productivity of labour (to produce more 
“wealth”) is attributed to capital, as in the theory of the productivity of capital (see Rubin 
1972). Therefore, the development of the means of production appears “as a direct act and 
achievement of the capitalist who functions here as the personification of the social character 
                                               
9    What is more, with the growing importance of  the financial sector, even this detachment from concrete 
production, the sublime indifference towards concrete labour and supposedly absolute, abstract fluidity is 
presented as another skill of  the capitalist who, as a pure intelligence, hovers over the formless surface of  the 
production process, decides to invest here and then suddenly takes his money to another continent. We will 
return to this question while analysing the problem of  fluidity and abstract labour.    
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of labour, of the workshop as a whole” (Marx 1990 1053). That is why, e.g. technological 
innovations are attributed to the figures of genius individuals, who – like Steve Jobs or Bill 
Gates – represent and appropriate individually the work and creativity of various collectives, 
which have made these breakthroughs possible (for a detailed case-study of this process see  
Mazzucato 2013). Dominant ideology effaces the traces of the social character of the 
innovation processes (including the crucial role of public funding and the cooperation of 
diverse research teams). These ideological effects, however, are made possible thanks to        
a specific social relation, rooted in the actual historical process of technological progress. 
Capitalist alienation and the rapid development of the social means of production were and 
are simultaneous and coextensive. As Marx says: “the productive forces of social labour, 
came into being historically only with the advent of the specifically capitalist mode of 
production. That is to say, they appeared as something intrinsic to the relations of capitalism 
and inseparable of them” (Marx 1990, 1052). As we can see, Marx conceptualises alienation 
under capitalism not as the estrangement of a somehow fully developed, pre-existent 
substance, but as a historical process in which the social forces of production are developed 
precisely as alienated, expanding in an alienated form.  
 The products of labour (machines) owned by capitalists appear and act in the labour 
process as integral elements of capital. When an individual worker enters the workshop the 
technical and organisational framework, the cooperation in the workplace, the very sociality 
of labour itself act as something alien or even hostile to him – as means for disciplining and 
mobilising him to work. Science, organisation and the tempo dictated by machinery are 
actually means for extracting surplus-labour from the worker. On the level of socially 
objective appearance, the labour process in the capitalist company works as the valorisation 
process. 
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Subsumption of worker under capital10 
We have said that under capitalism the production process appears as an indivisible fusion of 
the labour process and the valorisation process. This unity is, however, an unequal one. The 
bearer of the valorisation process is subsumed under it11. Here is where the inversion takes 
place. In the labour process the worker uses the means of production to produce a product. 
She treats the materials and instruments of labour as means to her ends. When the labour 
process is subsumed under the valorisation process, it is no longer the worker who uses the 
means of production, but an animated means of production that employs and uses the 
worker to valorise value. The production of goods and services, together with circulation and 
consumption, is only a moment in the total process of the production of surplus-value. It is 
an illusion that capital produces things to satisfy human needs. It produces things in order to 
produce more capital. Things are produced as commodities in order to be sold with profit. 
Capitalist production is – first and foremost – the production of augmented value. The 
production of “stuff”, of material and immaterial social use-values, is only a means to the 
ultimate end, which is the infinite process of the valorisation of capital. To prove this, suffice 
it to think of the mass needs that are not satisfied, as in the case of the masses of workers and 
in the case of the people excluded even from the relation of wage-labour, whose demands are 
not capitalised due to the lack of an effective demand on their side. In other words: their needs 
and desires – even such as basic as food or healthcare – are irrelevant since they do not 
dispose of enough exchange value (money) to realise them.  
 The labour process serves only as a bearer, in the same manner as use-value serves   
as a “material substratum” (Marx 1990, 293) of exchange-value. The worker, in turn, serves as 
a carrier of the movement of the production of capital, which aims at unachievable abstract 
absolute wealth. The labour process is thus only a material presupposition of the valorisation 
                                               
10  I ask my reader to note that we are not dealing here with the idea of  „real subsumption of  life under 
capital”, but much more modestly, with subsumption of  the wage-labourer under capital in the production 
process. The idea of  real subsumption of  life under capital, made popular by Antonio Negri and his followers, 
assumes that after achieving the stage of  real subsumption, life as such – including language and affects – 
simply became totally identical with labour. This implies a very stadial and Eurocentric concept of  history (let 
us just think of  the places where the language of  the workers is explicitly excluded from the direct production 
process: as happens in Chinese factories or in warehouses of  Sports Direct in Nottingham, where workers are 
fined and can even be fired for talking to each other at work; see Annanikova 2014). What is more, the Negrian 
idea of  subsumption of  life under capital implies that the notion of  alienation of  the subject from its labour 
can no longer be operative: if  one’s life is simply, totally identical with one’s work there is nothing to be 
alienated from. In the section dedicated to the question of  „human capital” I will try to prove that this 
approach – although it brings some important insights – is simplified and over-general.  
11  Chris Arthur assumes that the category of  subsumption was taken by Marx from Schelling’s theosophy 
“where it signifies the absorption of  the finite by the infinite” (Arthur 2009, 156). 
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process, just as the body of a product serves only as a presupposition of the value of              
a commodity.  
 
Breaking the process 2: source and presupposition 
At this point an important distinction has to be introduced. As we have seen, Marx 
distinguishes use-value from value, the labour process from the valorisation process and the 
means of production from capital. Although productive forces appear in a specific socio-
economical form, they cannot be simply identified with it. Economical categories (such as value 
or capital) cannot be derived directly from the natural properties of products or from the 
means of production. The means of production are not capital by nature and labour does not 
intrinsically and necessarily have to take the form of capitalist wage-labour. Marx exposes this 
lack of continuity (“not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of value”). Value cannot 
be derived directly from  use-value, money from the technical properties of gold, and capital 
from the technical productivity of the means of production. As Isaac Illich Rubin12 has 
written in his groundbreaking Essay on Marx‘s theory of value, use-value is the presupposition but 
not the source of value. This distinction, although it might sound technical, is actually crucial 
for understanding the Marxian method. Marxism is often pictured (also by many Marxist, and 
at times by Marx himself) as based on a fundamental reduction. The “social” superstructure is 
reduced to its “material” basis. Here we can see a different Marxism. Its difference, in 
comparison to classical economy, lies precisely in the constant exposition of the non-
reducibility of social relations to things and vice versa: 
 
In order to discover the content of these social forms, the Classical Economists reduced 
complex forms to simple (abstract) forms in their analyses, and in this way they finally 
arrived at the material-technical bases of the process of production. By means of such 
analysis they discovered labor in value, means of production in capital, means of workers' 
subsistence inwages, surplus products […] in profit. […] Afterwards, when the given 
social-economic forms are finally reduced to their material-technical content, the Classical 
Economists consider their task complete. But precisely where they stop their analysis is 
where Marx continues. Since he was not restricted by the horizon of the capitalist 
economy, and since he saw it as only one of past and possible social forms of economy, 
Marx asked: why does the material-technical content of the labor process at a given level 
                                               
12   Rubin was an activist of  the Bund and Menshevik Parties and a scholar in David Riazanov’s Marx-
Engels Institute. He was persecuted and finally executed during the Great Purge. As Stalinist philosopher, 
Rosenthal  wrote, “The followers of  Rubin and the Menshevising Idealists treated Marx's revolutionary method 
in the spirit of  Hegelianism. The Communist Party has smashed these trends alien to Marxism” (Rubin 1979, 
1). 
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of development of productive forces assume a particular, given social form? Marx's 
methodological formulation of the problem runs approximately as follows: why does 
labor assume the form of value, means of production the form of capital, means of 
workers' subsistence the form of wages, increased productivity of labor the form            
of increased surplus value? […] Starting with the social forms as given, the Classical 
Economists tried to reduce complex forms to simpler forms by means of analysis in 
order finally to discover their material-technical basis or content. However, Marx, starting 
from a given condition of the material process of production, from a given level of 
productive forces, tried to explain the origin and character of social forms which are 
assumed by the material process of production (Rubin 1972). 
 
Thus, Marxian thought can be defined literally as a theory of social formations. While the 
fetishism of economists identifies things with their social form and takes them at face value 
as unproblematic, impenetrable, non-intelligible ultimate conditions13, Marx tries to 
problematise precisely the process of the formation of social forms. Classical economists 
were able to describe how subjects conform to apparently pre-given a priori conditions (how 
these conditions inform the motivations of the universal homo oeconomicus, how s/he adjusts to 
competition, how s/he innovates inside this framework etc.). Marx wants to show that these 
material conditions are social relations materialised: social relations, which manifest themselves in 
things and through things. He wants to grasp both the formation of individuals by the social 
forms they possess (possessing capital makes one a capitalist) and the emergence of social 
forms from the relations between people (the relation between labourers deprived of the 
means of production and the capitalist who possess this means is materialised in the means of 
production functioning as capital).  
 Inside the visual field of bourgeois economy  capitalist production “in which the 
process of production has a mastery over man, instead of the opposite” appears “to be as 
much self-evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labour itself” (Marx 1990, 
175). The two-fold character of the production process is therefore invisible. Capital is 
reduced to its physical “material substratum” to “means of production (raw materials, 
auxiliary materials, means of labour, tools, buildings, machines)” (Marx 1990, 981), it is 
treated as a thing “among other things” (Marx 1990, 998). These things, however, 
miraculously seem to possess the right and the power to hire and control labour. The 
fetishism of  political economists reduces the process of valorisation to the process of labour, 
concealing the opposite movement of practical reduction, in which labour matters and counts 
– in literal, economic sense – only when it participates in the valorisation process generating 
surplus-value. 
                                               
13   “We cannot pursue the question of  what the particular elements of  our system ‘are’ and why they are as 
they are, right up to their ‘ultimate grounds’. We take them as given” (Schumpeter, cited in: Backhaus 1992, 61).  
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Capital beyond true and false 
According to Feuerbach, the proponent of the critique of religion who  we met in the 
previous chapter, religious imaginative inversion “stands in most glaring contradiction to our 
fire- and life-insurance companies, our railroads and steam engines, our picture galleries, our 
military and industrial schools, our theatres and scientific museums” (Feuerbach 1957, XIX). 
In the writings of the mature Marx this apparently sober world of modern society, technology 
and economy is exposed to be far more enchanted. What is enchanting us is not, however, 
some pre-modern dark remnants of pre-capitalist social systems, which have not yet been 
fully modernised. Enchantment, or myth, lies at the very heart of capitalist reality. The 
strange inversion which subsumes living human beings under the movement of valorisation is 
naturalised and secularised. It is treated as something absolutely normal, as the very core of   
a sober, disenchanted reality in principle.  
 “The market” presents itself as the best source of information, as the principle of 
selection and generation of the most rational/economic actions and decisions. Capital aims at 
defining the very standards of what is real or realistic, by placing itself as the ultimate 
rationale of social production and as the model of rationality, to which human subjects must 
adjust their behaviour.  
 If one does not succeed, it only proves that s/he was unable to internalise these 
contingent but always necessary (and thus: rational) judgements. If I am unemployed, it only 
proves that I was unable to predict what skills the market will demand in the future. And I 
am the only one to blame. Revelation of the unknown law is identical with its trespassing and 
with punishment. Each result of the interplay of  market forces – however irrational and 
unpredictable it might have been – is retrospectively rationalised as the expression of the 
power of  economic reason. Capital’s theodicy justifies itself, positing itself as “neither true or 
false but simply real” (Jameson 2014, 26) in the sphere of the indiscernible, where the reality 
principle and capital’s phantasmic becoming – merge. It is as it is: an ultimate rationale 
resonating with the tautological power of incantation.  
 For the dominant doxa it is perfectly natural that capital employs and commands 
labour. It finds nothing extraordinary in the fact that millions of people, in order to get their 
means of subsistence, wake up every day to go to work for other people, who happen to 
own/represent the means of production. This is repeated every day, so we  have time to get 
used to it, since we practically take part in it (as producers) every day we work, and (as 
consumers) every day we go shopping. It is almost impossible to see anything strange in the 
fact that the worker does not work for himself, but for capital represented by the capitalist, 
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and thus miraculation, in which human beings are turned into mere moments of the becoming 
of abstract capital’s becoming, goes unnoticed. The “mystical result” of the process is 
disenchanted. 
Miraculation and disenchantment form the structure of fetishism: both elements 
simultaneously constitute each other and can be distinguished only analytically. 
Disenchantment (which conceals, effaces and justifies the quasi-theological status of capital) 
reduces it to pure use-value. The miraculous power of things employing living labourers, 
presents itself as nothing more than an attribute of things qua things, as brute fact. Let us now 
see how the conditions for this are made. 
 
The making of the real existing capitalism 
The conditions are already set from the beginning, and the worker is always late. Capital 
reproduces itself by reproducing the very social relation, the conditions which make it 
possible. This  implies reproducing wage-labour on the one hand, and capital on the other.    
It also implies making the encounter between these two as unavoidable as possible. As 
Fredric Jameson rightly notes on ex re “primitive” accumulation, 
 
This type of social evolution takes place […] not by virtue of some disembodied Hegelian 
essence called capitalism or the market, nor either by some psychological drive rooted in 
human nature, but rather by a systematic negation of everything which might have 
permitted an alternative to them” (Jameson 2014, 86).  
 
This happens with so called “continuous primitive accumulation” (De Angelis 1999). 
Attempts to make a living, conducted e.g. in 16th century England or 21st century Ghana, by 
the members of rural communities are systematically blocked by capitalists and state officials, 
who privatise and appropriate natural resources, which were previously held in common. 
This produces not only conditions for the capitalist accumulation of resources, but also         
a surplus-population – and thus a potential workforce. Access to land and resources makes 
possible the very existence of these populaces. When it is limited, members of these groups 
are forced to enter into a productive relation to capital on unfavourable terms in order to 
survive, accepting low-wages and hard working conditions. 
 These examples, which could be multiplied by recalling the process of dismantling 
the welfare model and building the “workfare” model in its place in  First and Second World 
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countries14, show that “the actually existing capitalism” (Wacquant 2012) is something very 
different from “the free-market economy”, as pictured by the free-trader vulgaris. Rather than 
being based on the principle of non-intervention, it operates by means of continual political 
intervention on behalf of capital.  
 The worker is made to work for a capitalist, since access to goods and services is 
necessarily mediated by capital as capitalists already own the means of production. And since 
the materials, instruments and the productive time of the worker herself belong to the 
capitalist, thus when the worker objectifies her labour, she objectifies it as something 
belonging to someone else. Capital is established as the precondition of wage-labour deprived 
of the means of production (I have no capital that is why I have to sell my labour-power to    
a capitalist to keep on living). At the same time capital is the result of each act of labour (my 
product, when objectified, constitutes capital confronting me). This is how it tries to establish 
itself as historical necessity. That is a contingent event, an encounter, which reproduces itself by 
conditioning the conditions of possibility and impossibility of the social process. Or to use 
the Paulinian idiom: as eon-archon, the basic principle of this world under which we are sold 
(Galatians 4:3, Romans 7:14). 
 
A man-made god 
Our daily gestures could thus be exposed as something utterly strange: ritual acts building      
a monstrous “god” above us. It is a god who, in being created, is established as the quasi-
cause of the social – a god who, being produced is grafted onto production as its organising 
principle – a god who realises and actualises himself in the human acts of production, 
circulation and consumption – a Hildegardian god who has no other hands or heads than 
ours. Being an inhuman Entity, not “trans-historical and knowing” but “historically 
determined and blind” (Postone 1996, 76–77), it cannot act and think otherwise than through 
the acts and thoughts of its human bearers. It is a structure established in human practices, 
which structures human consciousness and unconsciousness, but itself has no self-
consciousness and no ego.  
 Its theological character is therefore purely social, not metaphysical. It could be 
described as “meta-physical” or “super-natural”, but only in a very specific, literal sense of 
these words. That is: as something that edifies itself over-nature, over the bodies of things 
                                               
14   Legislation implemented in Hungary gives an instructive example of  this tendency in almost all the 
European countries. See Agence France-Presse 2014, Orban trumpets harsh Hungarian ‘workfare’ scheme 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/140309/orban-trumpets-harsh-hungarian-workfare-scheme. 
For a theoretical account of  this problem see Lazzarato 2012. 
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and people, which serve as its presuppositions. Finite human beings and finite things, from 
which capital abstracts itself, are its conditio sine qua non. The actual becomes phenomenon, but 
the Idea has no other content than this phenomenon, as young Marx notes ex re Hegelian 
post-metaphysical notion of the Spirit (see Marx 1992, 62). There is nothing but an 
interrelation of man to man, nothing but human inter-subjectivity that is the sole god – as 
Feuerbach says.  
 The result of such a disenchantment, however, remains strange and does not 
resemble the dreams of harmony, love and equality derived from the equation god = man + 
man by Feuerbach and other “gentlemen humanists, atheists, socialists and democrats” 
(Gombrowicz 1989, 69). In the relation of man to man, “in this other church made of 
people” certain surplus meaning and power is exuded: “a by-product of thousands                
of impulses […] a play of creative forces […] a deity, […] born of people, ‘superior’ to me 
but only by an inch” (Gombrowicz 1989, 73–74), an incessant interplay of seduction and 
domination. In Gombrowicz’s description this surplus was transferred onto a divinised tyrant 
(“Hitler” who became a monstrous collective body that overwhelmed the flesh and blood 
Adolf Hitler himself). In capitalist production “the constant transposition” (Marx 1990, 1057) 
of energy, power and meaning is more omnipresent and less visible, since the totality of socius 
– which appears to be identical with the incessant production of production-distribution-
consumption – cannot be identified with anybody. Be it the corpus of a king, a concrete 
capitalist, a corporation or even the total stock of material wealth. 
 
Irony of the spirit15 
Whoever finds this evaluation of the power of capital exaggerated should perform a simple 
thought experiment, which Adorno recommended to absolute skeptics. All those who believe 
that now god is dead, that in postmodernism everything is permitted, that everything that is 
solid, melts into air should try to stop going to work for some time and see what happens. At 
the end of the day, the bottom line is the bottom line.  
 It would be wrong, however, to neglect the power of the irony of the relativist. 
Something real and objective speaks through it. Yet what speaks is not so much the human 
ironic subject, but the process of capital’s self-valorisation of itself. It is not this or that 
individual, nor is it his or her individual thinking process that has the power to relativise 
everything except itself. In this case, the irony of the human subject reflects the irony of  
                                               
15  In the matter of  interrelations of  irony and system, see a remarkable analysis in Olesik 2014, to which 
the present study owes a debt. 
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infinite movement.  Self-irony works here as violence of the individual against her/himself 
exercised in the name of the objective, collective process. Like a class clown derives some 
pleasure from participating in collective fun – even if he violently ridicules himself – the 
ironist derives some satisfaction from participating in the objective irony of the spirit of 
capital. I mock myself in order to anticipate mockery. Not only the mockery of the group but 
also the objective ridiculousness of my individual existence in confrontation with the total 
process. The internalisation of the relativising movement of capital (which makes the 
distinctions between the “spirit of lightness” and the “spirit of heaviness” or between “open” 
and “closed” systems irrelevant) takes place not only in thoughts. One tries to imitate and 
integrate the incessant movement of valorisation in the movement of one’s body (Quantified 
Self movement, aimed at measuring one’s performance by means of trackers and other 
electronic devices and the comparison of one’s result and status via social media, being          
a radical but telling example). The human subject tries to get moving, to “join the 
movement”,16 to go with the flow of capital before the wave sweeps him or her away. 
 
Fetish of human capital  
The line of 1) abstract labour (indifferent to the particular, concrete shape of this and that 
job), and the line of 2) concrete labour (with which the worker identifies him/herself as for 
example “tele-marketer” or “junior brand manager”) are forced to coincide. Ironic non-
identification with one’s social position is proclaimed a virtue of flexibility, coinciding with 
the compulsion to identify with each and every menial and temporal position. Mobilisation 
has to be spelled out in every motivational letter and acted out during consequent job 
interviews17. The estrangement effect works as shock therapy, which forces the subject to 
adjust itself to a changing market. Fusion of abstract and concrete neutralises the potential 
                                               
16  See e.g. an add by vivosmart: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRymY6Qz-os 
17  Since one coincides with one’s human-capital, one is simply “selling oneself ”, to use an expression 
proclaimed by the dominant powers with shameless innocence, proving how explicitly commodity has become 
its own ideology. For a good example of  a show which condenses, exposes and sells the compulsion of  
competition and necessity of  selling one’s labour-power, see Dragon’s Den. Edycja polska 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZvwyXA0iCig) especially from 7:43 to 8:00 (knowing Polish is not 
necessary, it is enough to focus on expressions of  domination and self-domination inscribed on bodies and 
faces). It is important to note that in certain branches, where the alienating pressure exceeds the possibility of  
being tamed by pharmaceutical means, alienation itself  is openly proclaimed as the solution. A worker for         
a head-hunting agency, interviewed by me, reported that the management asks the employees not to identify 
themselves with their occupation („use only your operational self  when you’re at work”, as my friend has heard 
her boss say). This perhaps gives a useful methodological hint, which should make us wonder whether 
companies always try to achieve higher productivity by promoting conscious emotional identification with the 
job.    
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alienation effects by introducing the figure of human capital, in which human subject and 
capital merge. The position of the entrepreneur of self is produced by identification of one’s 
labour-power (capacities of one’s own body and mind which one is selling on the market for 
a wage) with one’s own human capital (treated as a personal source of income), creating an 
indissoluble fusion of human-capital, a phantasy on “capitalism without alienation” (Foucault 
2008). The basic distinction of Marxian political economy – the class distinction between 
capital and labour, elaborated through the analysis of fetishist unitary appearance – disappears 
since the worker’s workforce is proclaimed to be identical with his/her capital.  
It is claimed that alienation is suspended but an inner doubling remains. One is 
accountable before “one’s own” capital. The human subject is trained to justify his or her 
behaviour before this inner tribunal, proving to others and to  the self that the behaviour was 
productive enough. And this can never happen, since capital aims at immeasurable absolute 
wealth; hence there is no natural upper limit of exploitation (see Marx 1990, 252–253). The 
finite subject has been infused with the infinity of the movement of capital, and now can 
never be sure if s/he has made absolutely effective use of the time given. No work can fulfil 
the infinite law of capital’s accumulation. 
One has to “invest in oneself’ in order to achieve profits. Lack of success in such an 
investment only proves that one was unable to internalise the contingent but always necessary 
and thus rational judgements of the market. “There is nothing permanent except change” – 
as an expert from ManPower temporary work recruitment agency once said to the author of 
this text, with a matter-of-factness characteristic of this hylemorphic religion. Capital’s power 
comes not only from the fact that subjects are unaware of capital’s domination over their 
lives. Rather the sheer exposition of this domination, the pure power of facticity, which needs 
no other justification than its own power – works as a justification. It is as it is.  
 
Working by breaking 
Thus, certain doubts  can be raised concerning the narrative strategy of intensified 
estrangement employed here. The analytical method of our research was aimed at abstracting 
the labour process from the valorisation process. The labourer was thus confronted with the 
infinite movement of capital and presented as subsumed under it. The effect of sublimity 
emerges from the incommensurability of the human subject and the alienated mass of social 
forces, which infinitely overwhelm any finite body. This juxtaposition was supposed to de-
naturalise and de-rationalise the “reality” to which we are all too well-accustomed.  
 But the possible result of such a shock can simply be paralysis. The subject 
confronted with “the total system” might end up frozen  and mesmerised, contemplating 
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passively the processes of his/her own disappearance or even deriving certain pleasure from 
his/her own subjective disintegration (Jameson 2008). The concept of the death of the 
subject finds here its socio-economic basis and is not without practical, daily life correlations. 
As when overwhelmed  by pressure to concentrate yourself on multi-tasking projects at work, 
you come back home, too tired to think and you start to scroll Facebook walls or surf TV 
channels in order to distract yourself to the ultimate limit where you are finally tired enough 
to unplug and fall asleep. So doing you enter the spheres where the intensities of labour and 
subjective fragmentation exist in continuum, not in contradiction18, entering 
 
Those quicksands where a tree changes into nothing 
Into an anti-tree, where no borderline 
Separates a shape from a shape […]  
King of centuries, ungraspable Movement 
Now we have become equal to the gods 
Knowing in you, that we do not exist.  
(Miłosz 2001, 132–133). 
 
A mediocre archon 
Neither the demonological figuration, however, nor the recalling of the heroic persona of 
great tyrants should make this description too sublime. The image of sublime evil can be 
misleading, since it still contains too many remnants of romantic grandeur (like in the case of 
Thomas Mann’s demonisation of Nazism in Doctor Faustus, which might be read as                
a therapeutic narrative helping Germans to experience their history as something of at least 
negative greatness). One could say that the devil of our time is much more trivial, resembling 
less a fallen angel than a reasonable, mediocre, middle-age gentleman, who once paid a visit 
to Ivan Karamazov, declaring to be a non-entirely-non-existent “sort of phantom in life who 
has lost all beginning and end, and who has even forgotten his own name” (Dostoyevsky 
                                               
18   Here we find one of  the most significant shortcomings of  the theory of  a hidden but important 
protagonist of  this research, Polish Kantian/Marxian/Nietzschean/Catholic philosopher, Stanisław 
Brzozowski who believed that “Only that which exists for the sake of  labour really does exist. Everything else 
might just be a dreamlike semblance” (Brzozowski 1990, 173 [my translation – MP]). The blind spot of  
Brzozowski’s thought was the hallucinatory and narcotic nature of  intensified labour itself. However, the 
suppressed affinity of  dream and frenetic labour was from time to time brought to the surface of  his texts by 
the dynamic of  his modernist hypertrophic figurations.   
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2015, 1350)19. The dreariness and obtuseness of our everyday “Antichrist diluted” (to use the 
acute term created to express the nature of inertial power in the progressively non-ideological 
and technocratic times of the convergence between Eastern and Western Blocs, see 
Konwicki 1999, 158), the “unfinishness" of his bad infinity – an infinite cue to a doctor or      
a supermarket until, an infinitely postponed deadline – only makes its suffocating weight 
heavier. 
 
III INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION, OR SOME PRELIMINARY NOTES 
TOWARDS A WORKING ETHICS OF GRACE 
We have encountered some limits of our figurative strategy. Let me allow myself now to 
invite my reader to share some of my doubts and partake in some indecisive investigations. It 
seems that neither a sheer presentation of the demonised, totalising movement of capital, nor 
the effects of alienation produced by the juxtaposition of the infinite and finite, is sufficient. 
What is more, this kind of presentation does not give the real picture, since “the system” is 
far from being totally functional. It works by breaking the human subject, and itself it works 
as broken. However it would be one-sided to comfortably assume that the task of critique is 
simply to bring chaos into order, since, as old Deleuze quite rightly notes, social 
arrangements under capitalism “continuously generate attrition and loss, exclusion and 
dysfunction; [...] always contain potholes, tracts of wasteland, stagnant ponds of 
unproductiveness” (Deleuze 1996, 235, cited in Vogl 2015, 103). It is perhaps true that the 
Whole contains holes, but to say that is not to say much. Breakdowns do not have to lead 
automatically to an overcoming of “the system”. They may perfectly well end up simply 
exhausting the subject,as when the self-disciplining pressure to be productive and successful 
reaches its limit, or cannot even achieve the point of mobilization, which makes the subject 
get out of bed. Thus the pressure implodes into a reactive de-pression, which takes the 
burden of responsibility and self-mastery off the subject’s shoulders, opening the vast field of 
the boredom of unproductiveness and of the miseries of non-work. 
 Yet it seems that it would be equally wrong to assume that all the moments of 
dysfunctionality are nothing but functional elements of “the system” itself. Rather than 
overestimating the cleverness of capitalist unreason, it might be more fruitful to think of its 
ambivalences and blockages as things that have to be actively brought to the point of 
                                               
19   A much more subtle and in-depth reading of  this fragment in the post-Hegelian context, can be found 
in Aleksander Temkin’s unpublished book on Dostoyevsky, excerpts of  which have been published in Kronos, 
see Temkin 2014. 
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consistency, where the figuration of estranged dead works could reach the stage of actual 
conversion, turning towards liberation.  
 What does this mean when applied to our field of interest? And does it imply 
abandoning the analytical method which abstracts the labour process and the valorisation 
process? If we want to get nearer to the answer, we have to go back to our basic question: 
what is the relation of the “matter” of the labour process to the capitalist “form” of 
valorisation? Is the capitalist “formation” merely an exterior obstacle for the creative labour   
of the multitude, something that is only an artificial shackle, which is not embedded in labour 
itself, and thus can easily be shaken off? 
 I am writing this text inside a certain “framework”. If I will not publish texts in 
reviewed scientific magazines I will not get parametrised points, which measure my 
productivity. And if I fail to gain them, I will probably not get a studentship or a grant. Thus 
my attempts to make a living by being a researcher in the social sciences will be seriously 
threatened. It would be naïve to think that all this has no impact on my work. This 
“framework” or rather the fundamental Stimmung of capitalist social ontology, the generalised 
mood, the atmosphere of precarity and competition, definitely have some influence not only 
on the final product of my work, but also on the way I work. While writing this text, I had all 
of the above mentioned factors (deadlines, points, competition, the entire “publish-or-perish” 
thing) in mind. 
 Is it then right to say that all this ultimately makes capital the source of the text you 
are reading? Do people write texts of this kind solely to get points? And will the production 
of knowledge stop or diminish if lean production Toyotism will not be implemented in 
academia? Does the labour process have to be subordinated to the imperative of the 
valorisation of value? And if not, how can the distinction between the two be made in practice? 
 
The queen of sausages and concrete labour 
In The measure of a man, (La Loi du marché, Brizé 2015), a story of an everyman trying to      
make a living, we are situated in the familiar landscape of our everyday, mediocre archons. 
We meet a middle age ex-industrial worker, who gets a job in a supermarket. If we were to be 
lost among supermarket shelves in another film on the impotence of a “Kafkian” character 
destroyed by the omnipresent but impenetrable laws of the market, there would not be much 
sense in talking about it here. What makes the film highly original, in comparison to many 
anti-productivist social dramas, is the scene of a farewell party organised for Gisele, who is 
retiring after thirty or so years of work in the supermarket. Her fellow workers and members 
of management sing for her a rather clumsy nursery-rhymes farewell song. We can easily 
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imagine how this celebration could be portrayed as another humiliating, obligatory team-
building exercise. However, in The measure of man there is a glimpse of something altogether 
different. Both Gisele and the main character really are moved by the celebration. And when 
Gisele’s supervisor says that, although he is her boss, he could actually learn a lot from her 
about how the shop works it is something more than mere corporate bubble-talk. Of course, 
the brutal pressure to achieve profit is still there. Later we witness how the supervisor, who is 
probably personally a really nice guy, tries to “lean production”, firing another worker, who 
was caught stealing from the store, which ultimately leads to her suicide. But the fact that the 
film allowed this moment of the celebration of the dignity of labour – which is neither           
a “creative” profession like, say, that of an artist or a hacker, nor is it like the occupation of a 
miner, which still has some kind of gravity of the working-class ethos, but the least socially 
prestigious and most alienating supermarket job – the fact that this scene was allowed to 
enter into the picture is an act of revolutionary courage. It would not be very hard to ridicule 
the emotions of Gisele and of the main protagonist as  naiveté which does not see the actual 
state of affairs, but forgets for a moment about the fact of alienation and acts as if there was 
no exploitation. However, this act of conscious forgetting might take us further than we 
expect. Let us come back to Marx. He writes  that when we 
 
[…] proceed directly to the immediate process of production, we find that it is primarily a labour 
process. In the labour process the worker enters as worker into a normal active relationship 
with the means of production determined by the nature and the purpose of production 
itself. He takes possession of means of production, the way they hold fast of their 
independence and display the mind of their own, their separation form labour – all this is 
now abolished [aufgehoben] in practice (Marx 1990, 1007). 
 
This moment when the worker gives himself fully to his activity, in practice forgetting about 
the capitalist, is possible only “if we consider the production process just as a labour process” 
(Marx 1990, 107). The act of abstraction, which does not see that the worker in practice must 
work for a capitalist, is definitely an element of the “mystification of capital” (Marx 1990, 
1052). This mystification, in the times of human capital, is aimed at making self-exploitation 
operative. That is, activating “the boss option” inside the worker himself. The worker is 
convinced by HR pundits, the managerial board and the authors of self-help manuals that he 
does work for himself, in order to realise himself. At the same time he is incessantly 
reminded (by the very course and tempo of the process and by the excessive pleasure derived 
by his bosses from the sheer manifestations of power, however petty they might be) that, yes, 
there is a boss over him, and that the mystification of capital is only a semblance.  
 Sometimes, however, the workers take this “essential formality” of capital (Marx 
1990, 1064) more seriously than capital takes it, itself. They start to act as if they really did not 
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need a capitalist to work20. Thus they try to decapitate “the alien head”, the caput of capital. 
Companionship, identification with one’s workplace and the will to fight for it were already 
there, when they were working, before the conflict with the capitalist burst. All of this was 
there as the basis of potential autonomy, as the author of this text noticed in participating in 
the organisation of the protests of school kitchen workers in Warsaw in 2012. The workers 
gave value to their jobs and used this self-valorisation as an argument for the media, parents 
and local authorities, stressing that at work they feed and take care of children, not being 
motivated in the first instance by profit; in contrast to private catering companies, which were 
about to replace the local government as their new employers. Thus, identification with one’s 
occupation and one’s position as members of “the caring classes” – taking the promise of     
a meaningful job more seriously than capital takes it – was an extremely important factor in 
the workers’ mobilisation21.  
The dignity of labour is worth considering not only as a potential point of 
confrontation with the capitalists and its delegates, but also in itself – as something which on 
a daily basis binds people at work together and produces the interwoven worlds in which we 
all live. Perhaps we can push this thought even further. I am tempted to say (however non-
revolutionary and un-Marxian it might sound), that perhaps the value of these living-worlds 
lies not only in their potential autonomy in confrontation with capital, but precisely in the 
fact, that fortunately they cannot just be reduced to the point of resistance, nor to their 
creative, productive potential. That in the end, it is not all about capital and class struggles. 
 
Gena the Crocodile and abstract labour of the precariat 
Now let us see how the operation of taking capital more seriously than it takes itself could 
work with abstract labour. In order to do so, I would like to turn to a much greater artwork:   
a classic Soviet cartoon Gena the Crocodile (Kachanov, Uspensky 1971)22. The fact that it takes 
place in the country of Stakhanov speedup and labour competition, which is reflected in the 
overwhelming melancholy of the cartoon, should make us suspicious towards all the idyllic 
                                               
20   The focus on the necessity of  building the workers movement as a movement of  people who are able 
to work freely, without compulsion (that is: able not work compulsively) remains a true achievement of  the late 
Stanisław Brzozowski, leading him beyond the limits of  his productivism. See especially his essay on Charles 
Lamb (Brzozowski 2007).  
21   One could even say that the workers were using the traditional, patriarchal archetype of  “The Polish 
Mother”, which in the context of  their actions produced very different effects. For an analysis of  the use of  
gendered roles in women workers’ struggles in communist Poland see Kenney 1997. 
22   I would like to thank Aleksander Szostakowski for this idea. 
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images of labour. However, we find here an idea worth considering if we are to construct      
a distance with our work, which will be something more than  mere self-irony.  
 The film begins when a salesman (although this is not a very accurate description, 
since nobody in the cartoon uses money) finds a little creature, Cheburashka in a box of 
oranges. Not knowing what to do with her, he takes her to the  Zoo. He brings her to           
a security guard, who leads Cheburashka inside to see if they will be able to find a home for 
her there. The guard enters the zoo, and the former “salesman” takes his gun, happy to 
replace him on guard, until he is back with Cheburashka. This scene can be read not only as   
a metaphor of the absolute indifference towards the individual in an ideal totalitarian state, 
but also as the exposition of an important feature of the market economy: flexibility. Labour in 
capitalism becomes more abstract, that is: it abstracts from this or that concrete feature of 
labour, from the particular character of a concrete occupation (Marx 1990, 1013). Capital 
treats labour only as its presupposition and it is not bound to its concrete shape, thus it can 
be invested otherwise. The only condition is bringing profit. We all witness this with the 
brutal imposition of labour flexibility, which forces workers to adjust themselves to            
the fluctuations of the labour market. 
  This feature, however, – if estranged to a certain limit – can also work otherwise. 
The idea of being able to freely change one’s occupation alludes ultimately to the idea of the 
abolition of the strict division of labour. What is more, flexibility can be contradicted with   
the obstacles to flexibility produced by capitalism itself. Although flexibility is proclaimed      
a virtue, the highly competitive labour market with its big reserve army of the unemployed, 
makes people in many sectors cling to their occupation; however unsatisfactory it might be. 
Workers become less willing to change jobs and start something afresh (as a popular saying 
among workers in a middle-size Polish city goes, “Stick to your job, because if you lose a job 
in Lublin you will never get it back”). It might therefore be useful to show that flexibility 
itself is a term, which can be polarised and divided along class lines. Flexibility for the 
capitalists means iron laws for the workers. Flexibility for the workers (that is a real, legally 
enshrined and politically guarded possibility to take more days off or to  go on maternity 
leave without increasing your colleagues’ workloads) relies on building stable jobs, shortening 
the working week and reinforcing safety nets provided by the state. Showing that the 
imposition of the capitalist interpretation of flexibility fails to provide its proclaimed results, 
leading to an actual decrease in productivity (which has been noted even by 
mainstream/popular organisational science magazines, see Santorski 2015) can be a step 
towards this23. 
                                               
23   A possible contradiction between the capitalist imperative of  ever-increasing productivity and the 
conditions posited by capital itself, is ever more evident in the sphere of  knowledge production. As Aronowitz 
and Difazio already noted more than twenty years ago, there is a tension between capitalist growth based on 
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 The workers could therefore demand to be flexible on their own terms, but this 
means contradicting capitalist flexibility. This seems to be necessary if we are to have at least 
as much autonomy in our job as Cheburashka’s friend, Gena, who, in spite of simply being    
a crocodile is not identical with his position, all the while working at the zoo as a crocodile 
[работает в зоопарке -  крокодилом], leaving his cage early every afternoon, dropping the key at 
the reception and simply going home.  
 Moreover, it is precisely flexibility, produced by the abstract character of labour, 
which grounds the condition of the possibility of solidarity among workers beyond the 
narrow limits and boundaries of particular branches and trades. The abstractness of flexibility 
returns now with great power in the concept of the precariat. It is however necessary to face 
the truth that it remains a negative notion. A possible alliance between this abstract, negative 
universality and the embedded concreteness of identification with one’s job, remains a matter 
of political construction24.  
 Perhaps the same could be done with other concepts, which we treat as 
unredeemable, such as creativity or even entrepreneurship. Of course those who say that we 
should not repeat them light-heartedly are definitely right. These kinds of words are by no 
                                                                                                                                                   
scientific innovations and the rules of  the game imposed on academia by capital itself. When the US 
government withdrew its direct participation in research, claiming that it will be replaced by knowledge-hungry 
bio-tech companies, funding for basic research in this field was reduced by almost two thirds (Aronowitz and 
Difazio 2012, 390). But the problem lies not only in the fact that private enterprises are mainly interested in 
short-term gains, which preclude far-reaching (and thus not immediately profitable) research. “For the plain 
truth is that overfunding and useless knowledge is the key to discovery” (Aronowitz and Difazio 2012, 267). 
Science, as Marx foresaw in his Grundrisse, becomes a direct productive force but “the subordination of  
knowledge to the imperative of  technical innovation undermines one of  the central presuppositions               
of  innovation: unfettered free time for knowledge producers. In recent years this contradiction has been at play at 
universities, even the first-tier institutions, which place increasing administrative burdens on faculty; the second 
tier impose, in addition, heavier teaching loads. Under impact of  economic constraints we have entered a new 
era of  academic cost cutting and of  surveillance whose intended as well as unintended effects are to discourage 
independent intellectual work” (Aronowitz and Difazio 2012, 369).This kind of  situation can be a point of  
departure for an organised action, which could turn mere dysfunctionality into a proper (=politicised) 
contradiction.  
24   This would mean above all else building an alliance between the organised workers, still having 
relatively stable job contracts and the precariat working on the basis of  temporary contracts. However, the 
generalised fear of  precarity does not have to lead automatically to this kind of  coalition. The angst and 
resentment of  increasingly precarious labourers can be simply turned against the unionised workers still having 
such “privileges” as regulated working hours or minimal wage (for an example of  such “race to the bottom 
logic” in the context of  the recent miners’ strike in Poland see Pitala 2015). Thus the construction of  such       
a coalition would require 1) picturing stable occupations not only as anchors stabilising the labour market or 
bastions of  the good old days, but also as the bridgeheads of  quality jobs: quality which should be further 
generalised to other sectors 2) creating links between public sector workers and the recipients of  public 
services. In the case of  teachers or health-workers, the success of  such an alliance relies on showing how 
intensified workloads lead to the worsening of  services (e.g. leaner schools = more kids in each class-room = 
worse learning conditions for students). This could lead to the mobilisation of  parents and patients around the 
postulates of  “the caring classes” reformulated in such a communal context. For an instructive example of  
bringing together workers and their community see Ontario Health Coalition 
http://www.ontariohealthcoalition.ca 
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means innocent or neutral. Being deeply immersed in capitalist newspeak, they refer to the 
whole set of implicitly invoked premises and presuppositions, which should not be 
unconsciously reproduced25. But maybe the awful lot of work, expended everyday by 
workers, is too easily wasted when critics see in the expenditure of workers’ energy nothing 
but participation in a fallen “system”? Perhaps we could try a different experiment. An 
experiment which would make an attempt to see in the energy of the workers, and even in 
the energy of their supervisors and bosses, a kind of pure entrepreneurship. Perhaps, a purified 
entrepreneurship which could be abstracted from actual capitalist production, by an 
estranging gaze is something worthy of being saved?  
 
Discerning spirits  
We have just encountered the old opposition between exchange value (mutated into the 
interchangeability of abstract labours) and use-value (disguised as concrete labour). And now 
we are forced to test it - one last time, in this text. Use-value is a strange concept indeed, 
resonating with utopian and erotic overtones, promising sensual satisfaction through contact 
with things in the act of consumption or in the act of labour. It is always at risk of sliding 
back into certain Edenic naturalism; it is easy to picture it as an urge to return to a beatific 
epoch, when unmediated objects were supposedly fully present and directly achievable. As 
such, it is probably one of the most vulnerable points under the conceptual armour of both 
Marx and some of his romantic followers (especially the young Lukacs). This vulnerable - i.e. 
both weak and intimate - point has become the object of many critiques. And one of the 
most influential critiques of “use-value” in recent years is obviously that of Jacques Derrida. 
 Marxian conceptual machinery was programmed to safeguard itself against possible 
critiques of this kind. The author of Das Kapital did not forget to emphasise that neither is 
use-value simply “natural” nor does the labour process takes place in the realm of pure 
nature, since its product is always pre-determined by human needs/desires, which are 
themselves historical creations/social products. He also acknowledged that modes of usage 
cannot be fixed, and that its historical modulations transform the very inner “objective 
nature” of both the object of use and of its user26. 
                                               
25   Let us just think of  Antonio Negri’s uncritical use of  the idea of  “the productive nature of  the 
multitude”, which re-establishes the good old Stalinist and capitalist imperative of  being always active and 
productive. 
26   “Firstly, the object is not an object in general, but a specific object which must be consumed in              
a specific manner, to be mediated in its turn by production itself. Hunger is hunger, but the hunger gratified by 
cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the 
aid of  hand, nail and tooth. Production thus produces not only the object but also the manner of  
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 But since the objective of this work should not be to “defend Marx” against his 
“critics”, we have to ask: is his counterargument sufficient? The answer is crucial because 
what is being questioned here is the legitimacy of Marx’s supposed ideal: the ideal of a fully 
enlightened society, a society without fetishes. Or, if we agree on the terms towards which 
Derrida pushes the question, the legitimacy of the ideal of society without the spirits (of the 
past and future), a fully contemporary society, a society entirely of this time and of this world. 
It is precisely what is at stake in our enquiry all the way long: the possibility of the existence 
of secular thought and the status of the “spectral” and of the “spiritual" in the critical 
theology we are trying to sketch out here. 
 To avoid repeating unsatisfactory indefinite accusations and equally indefinite 
justifications let us first state that the question is not: whether Marx wished to come back to   
a simpler past, and if he believed that in the societies long gone use-value was fully accessible, 
self-transparent, and denuded of any ideology. (He certainly did not believe in the possibility 
of such a return to the past and it is dubious if he believed that such a society ever existed in 
the first place. He certainly did conceive of the former social formations, in which 
exploitation was not bound to the dominance of  capitalist value-form as mystified and 
repressive.) But that is not the right question. Just as the answer is not that the true use-value 
simply lies somewhere in the future of socialist society. To say so, as Fredric does in his 
commentary on Spectres of Marx (Derrida et al. 2008, 54–55), is simply to defer the pressing 
problem ad infinitely. 
 The questions of past social formations and their relations to capitalism and the 
question of the possible events coming from the future will necessarily arise. But                
the conditions of asking them will be reformulated. By modulating their presuppositions I 
will try to repeat Derrida’s questions without repeating his answers, which I find 
unsatisfactory. The main reason for this dissatisfaction lies in his lack of discernment: in 
Derrida’s eyes all the spirits seem to, ultimately, melt together. What I propose here is  
training in a certain discipline of discernment. As it is said: “do not believe every spirit, but 
test the spirits” (1 John 4:1).  
 We will start by introducing possible distinctions in the genealogy of the present age, 
while trying to avoid the identification of the spirit of capitalism with the spirt (culture, value 
etc.) tout court, and to avoid identification of all actual and possible past social formations as 
nothing but steps leading necessarily to capitalism. Then, we will proceed towards specifying 
the terms, which could help us  question the future, without simply satisfying oneself with 
putting our trust indifferently in the abstract mysticism of “openness”.   
                                                                                                                                                   
consumption, not only objectively but also subjectively. Production thus creates the consumer.” (Marx 1973, 
92) 
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 When thinking about the past (that is, about the genealogy of  present-day 
capitalism) Derrida – as many others – seems to take on board too much teleology by 
identifying all of the past spirits as the wannabe spirits of capital. When he says,  “The 
‘mystical character’ of the commodity is inscribed before being inscribed” (Derrida 2006, 
202) he is certainly right, up to a determinant point. He is right in describing the fact that, in   
a pure market society every use-value is already being determined by the context of the 
dominance of  capitalist value. Or, to express the same in temporal terms, Derrida describes 
the fact, or facticity of being “thrown” into the market. The fact that, as we tried to show in 
this text, “there is no original labour-week”, there is no first day of labour and one is always 
late when measured against capital which is always-already there. That is an effect (but only an 
effect), an incessantly produced effect, of the “absolute contemporaneity” of capitalist 
society, an effect of incessant eternalisation (Verewigung, see: Balibar, 272) of the conditions of 
its social reproduction. However - and here is where teleology, too much teleology – enters 
Derrida adds that not only capitalism eternalises itself but it actually is eternal, it truly was 
there all the time, as a necessary possibility, actualising itself in the course of history : 
 
Just as there is no pure use, there is no use-value which the possibility of exchange and 
commerce (by whatever name one calls it, meaning itself, value, culture, spirit [!], 
signification, the world, the relation to the other, and first of all the simple form and trace 
of the other) has not in advance inscribed in an out-of-use excessive signification that 
cannot be reduced to the useless. A culture began before cultureand humanity. 
Capitalization also. [my emphasis – MP] (p. 200–201) 
 
Here Derrida not only identifies spirit with exchange-commerce-valorisation (which might be 
right, following Levinas’ dictum that: "Economic life is the ontological space wherein 
creature is transformed into spirit…”27) but also pictures all the possible economical 
exchanges, all the excesses of valorisation, which go beyond simple use as - in potentia and 
necessarily - capitalistic. The global market is there in nuce, already in the barter-exchange of 
shells between  primitive fishermen. The teleology implied here is the following: there was 
exchange in every historical, human society - thus every society is potentially-necessarily 
capitalistic.  
 To make things clear: I am not accusing such a subtle thinker as Derrida of being 
simply wrong at this point. The position he stands for is defendable as long as it says that - 
                                               
27   “…or, if  we may use a terminology that has become suggestive, it is the space wherein flesh is opened 
up to the Word. (…) every relation is a transaction, that the relation with the Other can be brought about only 
to the extent that it engages us materially in some way or other, and that consequently everything must be done 
with justice. [..]” (Levinas 1997, 126). 
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retroactively speaking, when we look back at history from the present point of view, and we 
see this point as the peak of history - all  past societies present themselves as always having 
been haunted by the possibility of becoming capitalistic. It is undeniable that capital does 
truly incessantly work in order to establish itself as the final aim of the past. That is why all 
past societies now seem to have been weighing secretly towards capitalism. The problem lies 
in the specification of this possibility, which in the hands of Derrida (despite his efforts to 
delimit his position from the vulgar ontology of success exemplified by Fukuyama)  becomes 
necessity. When this is done, the story of the genealogy of capitalism, untold in the Spectres of 
Marx, but present there as an unarticulated presupposition, inevitably goes as follows. All past 
cultures - by mere fact of having been culture at all, by virtue of valorising things beyond 
utility - were always inhabited by the virus, and that virus was capital. When the 
immunological system of these societies, aimed at expelling usury as sin, that is at exorcising 
the possibility of making money for the sake of making money (which, in this narrative, is 
immediately identified with the faculty of valorising values, with every possible kind of 
autotelic, non-directly-useful or non-directly-consumable action), when this immunology has 
been weakened the ever-present virus attacked and prevailed. When blockages and obstacles 
were taken down, exchange immediately matured into capitalist exchange (which, in truth, it 
has always been), realising its ever present potential. The only condition for the emergence of 
capitalism was “negative”; once the obstacles had been removed, the natural (or cultural or 
eternal or spiritual) tendency to give value to the abstract, to exchange, was liberated.  
 The problem here (let us repeat) is not that such a description is simply wrong. Since 
capitalism succeeds in reproducing itself, it really does succeed in establishing itself - not only 
in portraying itself, but also in establishing itself - as the final destination of all past history. 
Just as it often succeeds in establishing the valorisation of capitalistically understood value as 
the invisible centre towards which every action,  now conceived as investment in oneself, 
should gravitate. The problem lies not in stating that capital has indeed succeeded and still 
succeeds in establishing itself as necessity (to negate that would be equal to negating the real 
load weighing on us), but in forgetting that it is a merely historical necessity. Historical means 
here: a very peculiar, complicated and “positively” constructed way of managing this “out-of 
use excess”, which human beings carry inside themselves.28   
 Whatever way of dealing with this excess (or lack thereof) that we choose, it seems 
much more fruitful to analyse capitalism not as an ever-present eternal-natural-cultural 
                                               
28   An excess which we tacitly accept when we epitomise it as the “metaphysical” possibility of  a worker to 
produce more than is necessary for his reproduction (as in Henry 1983), or as the power of  ascesis, which 
enables human beings to engage in an activity without an external purpose (as in Stimilli 2011), or finally – if  
we are more skeptical towards natural theology or agnostic asceticism than the two authors mentioned above – 
as the original surplus/debt producing and produced by the law of  death. 
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potential, which was simply liberated from its feudal shackles with the advent of modernity 
when the negative barriers disappeared, but rather as a very specific positivity. A positivity 
which had to be laboriously and often violently constructed - both consciously, 
“unconsciously”, purposefully and accidentally. Basing on historical work on the origins of 
capitalism of such authors as Ellen Meiksins Wood (Wood 2002, 11-50) and the 
philosophical insights of Foucault (Foucault 1990) as well as of the  late Althusser (Althusser 
2014), this approach could show that there was nothing natural in the weird set of events, 
which in a specific historical conjuncture produced the set of political struggles, decisions, 
processes etc.,  that created the conditions for a very specific type of social organisation we 
call capitalism.  But why did e.g. well-developed technology and commerce in 15th century 
China not bring about capitalism, or why did the presence of densely populated cities, an 
appropriate legal framework and even some free-labourers  not produce capitalism in the 
Greco-Roman world? These seemingly obvious questions will be countered by another 
question, namely: why, and by set of what aleatory “causes” did such a strange thing as 
capitalism emerge? It will be then much less self-evident to speak of homogeneous pre-
capitalist societies (as if they were all the time necessarily heading towards capitalism) or about 
“failed transitions to capitalism”. To say so, is not to say that the mentioned social formations 
were necessarily “better” than capitalist societies29. To put it shortly and dogmatically, the 
indeterminacy and openness of history exists. But this openness does not give any place for 
hope by the mere fact of being open. There were many social formations and there are many 
social formations possible. Capitalism itself as a social formation can mutate in different 
directions. For example, it can mutate towards the greater importance of unfree or serf-
labour, which - as its suppressed history shows - is by no means incompatible with the 
supposed “essence” of capitalism. 
 This is how we have arrived  at the promised question of the historical “openness” 
of the future. Much caution is needed if we are not to fall prey to the “need for hope”. This 
urge, which was expressed by Derrida, was shared even by his most critical polemists. Want 
of hope is psychologically understandable, especially if we remind ourselves of the historical 
time when Spectres… were written. This was a time when triumphant neoliberalism seemed to 
be unconquerable, and when counting on the fickle future seemed like the only chance         
to save the light of messianic promise from going out. This is all understandable, but the 
                                               
29   It is then not to say that e.g. the extraction of  surplus from the peasantry in absolutist France by state 
officials was by nature better than the exploitation of  workers by the English agrarian capitalists of  the same 
period. Not to mention that to make such over-all comparisons between totalised “social systems” possible, we 
will have to first spend a good deal of  time not only on analysing, say, the “standards of  living” and the degree 
of  political freedoms (for an interesting example of  such a comparison concerning English popular classes 
before and after the Industrial Revolution see: Thompson 1988, 347-385), but also on elaborating at least         
a preliminary transhistorical set of  “common measures” against which the “the progress of  morals” could be 
measured in the first instance.  
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question remains: does this kind of trust, put in the indefinite future, not reproduce a reified 
opposition between the stable bourgeois cosmos and creative destruction, destabilisation or 
desynchronisation seen as necessarily good? This hope in “an unnamable and neutral power” 
(Derrida 2006, 211) of the abstract future, this faith put in “the messianic”, which “denudes 
itself in view of responding to that which must be absolute hospitality, the ‘yes’ to the 
arrivant(e), the ‘come’ to the future that cannot be anticipated, which must not be              
the ‘anything whatsoever’ (Derrida 2006, 217), does not this kind of indefinite hope fuel the 
hope that the Left puts in the crisis of capitalism? As if the very fact of destabilisation had to 
automatically bring change for good and not just more of the same, as we are witnessing now. 
Has not Derrida (and most of his opponents) underestimated the degree to which 
destabilisation can become a tool of crisis management of the economical system working as 
broken? 
 So, what can we do if we want something less indeterminate, something more 
determinant than the Derridian “messianic”? We could counterpose it with a more 
concretely, materially determined tradition – a tradition necessarily incarnated in institutional 
bodies: churches, parties and trade unions, in the bodies of dogmas and programs - as e.g. 
Terry Eagelton, a good Catholic-Marxist proposes in his polemic with Derrida’s anti-
institutional mysticism (Derrida et al. 2008, 85-88). That is not a bad idea in itself. But, what  
I will try to briefly sketch here is not only a different content of tradition but a different 
formal conceptual matrix - a matrix that perhaps can also be used by the people outside this 
tradition - for thinking politics. This proposition will try to distance itself from Derrida’s, but 
only for an inch. Firstly, it takes on board Derrida’s conviction, expressed also by Étienne 
Balibar, in the matter of distinguishing ideological spectres from “real” reality: 
 
[…] active 'appearing' (both Schein and Erscheinung, i.e. both illusion and phenomenon) 
constitutes a mediation or necessary function without which, in given historical 
conditions the life of society would be quite simply impossible. To suppress the 
appearance would be to abolish social relations. (Balibar 2007, 61) 
 
To affirm this is to say, yes, it is impossible to delimit Schein from Erschienung, to delimit 
ideology form truth, to discern spirits as long as we remain inside the social. “Social sive 
supra-sensible”, “social sive ideological”, social appearance-semblance as a necessary 
condition of visibility of the invisible and invisibility of many things visible as we know it. But 
only “as we know it”. Here is the point where we have to rely ultimately on the extra-social. Is 
this extra-social element truly as indeterminate and ungraspable, as Derrida seems to suggest 
in his almost entirely apophatic theology, which so recklessly gives us into the hands of 
indiscernible spirits? Out of the lack of space and time, and out of my own lack                    
of understanding I can only point in the direction of something/someone more determined. 
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A Spirit made Flesh, but a Spirit which is not a pure invisible remainder, or an ever present 
(im)potential, safe-guarding itself by escaping at  the right moment from its historical 
incarnation, but a Spirit made into concrete Flesh singularly and irrevocably, up to the very 
last limit and beyond. Speaking once again in the Marxian terms of our discussion, this would 
really be a Value-Flesh beyond use and exchange: a body that is used and consumed every 
day, transforming its consumers, but situating itself beyond both usefulness and 
exchangeability. Here is where Derrida seems to be on the right track30, but ultimately fails to  
think about Grace incarnated, killed and resurrected first in the concrete body of Jesus of 
Nazareth and then “repeated” every day in the piece of bread broken during Holy 
Communion - a very different short circuit between the historical and extra-historical of 
divine history. Test the spirits. “Every spirit that acknowledges that Jesus Christ has come in 
the flesh is from God”    (1 John 4:2). 
 
Allegories of freedom  
Let us sum up. We have seen how capital operates as a self-positioning semblance [Schein]. 
That is as a phantasm which makes itself real; a spirit which takes holds of heterogeneous 
elements and changes it into its organs, making a body for itself. This phantasmic becoming 
happens not only on the level of ideology, when all previous history is pictured as capital’s 
prehistory. More importantly it happens in the production process itself, when that, which 
preceded capital as its precondition – i.e. nature and labour – is turned into something 
derivative, something which appears to be a product of capital itself. 
 Yet capital’s opposite,freedom which fights against it, also operates in a strikingly 
similar manner. That is: by intervening at the level of historical a priori and positioning 
conditions for itself. It tries to condition the conditions of its social being, reclaiming for the 
human individual and human communities the dignity of a true cause, in a  world of 
supposedly extra-human and supposedly necessary results. This happens not only when         
a political demos (like the Greek people in the latest referendum, which was so easily and 
ironically overturned) aims at making a decision in the matters of political economy31. It can 
                                               
30   “One could say as much, moreover, if  we were venturing into another context, for exchange-value: it is 
likewise inscribed and exceeded by a promise of  gift beyond exchange. In a certain way, market equivalence 
arrests or mechanizes the dance that it seemed to initiate. Only beyond value itself, use-value and exchange-
value, the value of  technics and of  the market, is grace [so far, so good, but test the end of  the sentence… – 
M.P] promised, if  not given, but never rendered or given back to the dance.)” 
31  Nothing is more alien and abhorrent to the dominant doxa than the idea of  such democratic 
sovereignty: “there can be no democratic choice against the European treaties”, “the major threat to the 
stability of  the Eurozone is the existence of  the democratic system in the member states” – as bankers and 
eurocrats have univocally stated, commenting on the negotiations between the representatives of  the Greek 
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also take place on the mundane subjective level, when we manage to stand above the 
entanglements of our everyday compulsive cults, which keep us in bondage. 
 This happens by means of alienation, which “penetrates even to dividing soul and 
spirit, joints and marrow; judging thoughts” (Hebrews 4:12), leading to conversion. 
Conversion starts when we discover “another law at work in our bodies”, an alien power 
indwelling us. We can now tear ourselves apart, establish a distance and actually see our sins 
for the first time; and see that we are not identical with them. We are not tethered to our sins, 
and we do not have to drown with them. Now it becomes possible to turn away from them 
and to turn towards a point of alienation of myself from my self and from this world.  
 The point of all this is to make a different kind of freedom possible. A kind of 
freedom, which has to be snatched  from both the social (W)hole and the individuality, made 
in its image and likeness. Since we cannot be certain of our autonomy, and since the very idea 
of individuality might be a surface effect, a by-product of the workings of the rulers of this 
world, it is not enough to simply state “I think therefore I am!”. That would only reaffirm the 
malicious substance-becoming-Subject. Therefore in order to go beyond the gesture of 
simple self-assertion – in which the struggle for individual autonomy coincides with the drive 
of the capitalist socius – it might be better to treat our autonomy precisely as an allegory. 
 Although the method of the operation of freedom seems to resemble that of capital, 
it is ultimately contradictory and incomparable. To tell this story in the Paulinian allegorical 
images of Jacob and Esau, Isaac and Ismael: the son of slavery and the son of freedom are 
brothers, but the covenant of slavery oppresses and fights against the covenant of freedom – 
and it is impossible for them to inherit together (Galatians 4: 21-31, Romans 9:10). The new 
law of freedom is based on promise, which breaks the lineages of inheritance, breaking with 
the laws of this world.  
 The law of capitalist accumulation, as we have seen, works as broken. Not only 
because it produces dysfunction and loss, but, more importantly,because it cannot be 
fulfilled. No finite, human work can do justice to its infinite obligation. The finite subject can 
never be sure if s/he used the time given to him/her productively enough. The desire to justify 
oneself through work puts the subject to work, which cannot come to an end. The worker 
wants to reduce the productive tension created by precarity, to let steam off by working – and 
this is precisely the engine of accumulation. The impossibility of fulfilling this infinite demand 
by the finite deed of a finite subject is both its motor and its limit. No one can be saved by 
one’s work.  
                                                                                                                                                   
demos and representatives of  the apparent “objective necessities”. See Juncker 2015, and a comment on mBank’s 
twitter: https://twitter.com/mbank_research/status/559430820952563712. 
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 The covenant of freedom overturns this order, positing itself as the new principle of 
free praxis. It does not put the subject to infinite labour because it knows that this will end up  
increasing guilt, indebtedness and precarity. Under the new law of freedom, therefore, the 
divine justification which abolishes all debts –grace, that is – precedes action as its infinite 
source. First we believe, taking hold of this far-reached position, which exceeds our own 
capabilities, and then we mature towards it. Work becomes an expression and effect of grace. 
An explication of the work of grace exceeds the limits of this text. Let us then make              
a provisional ending, by stating that the new law establishes each act of freedom as an 
allegory of things not yet visible. 
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